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ABSTRACT 
The United States does not have a centralized organization tasked with the 
oversight or implementation of a domestic medical intelligence program.  Organizations 
throughout the nation have adopted a variety of definitions and operating procedures 
related to medical intelligence; however, they are inconsistent.  Additionally, most 
jurisdictions limit medical intelligence to epidemiological surveillance.   
This thesis will propose the structure, governmental organization, data sets, and 
reporting for a domestic medical intelligence center.  This center will require close 
partnership with other federal agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
governments.  In addition, this thesis will analyze medical intelligence operations within 
the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, the Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Health Affairs, the Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center, and the Los 
Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group. 
As this thesis shows, the development of a domestic medical intelligence center, 
covering a wide range of data sets, will allow for the effective collection, integration, 
analysis, and dissemination of both tactical and strategic actionable intelligence for 
federal and SLTT governments and private sector partners.  These actions will assist in 
addressing this significant gap and increasing our nation’s level of preparedness thereby 
improving our nation’s response to large scale incidents, both naturally occurring and 
man-made. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 defines medical intelligence 
(MEDINT) as “that category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental 
information that is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and 
operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the 
formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian 
sectors.”  While an effective definition for the Department of Defense, this does not 
address all the needs of the essential and emerging field of domestic medical intelligence.  
I propose that we define domestic medical intelligence as that category of intelligence 
resulting from the collection, integration, analysis, and dissemination of natural and man-
made psychological, chemical, biological, radiological, environmental, and agricultural 
information with a public health and health care focus that may influence the day-to-day 
activities or national security of the nation or national assets.   
I posit that there is a significant gap in existing domestic medical intelligence 
operations and that the development of a nationwide domestic medical intelligence center 
will help address that void.   
The United States currently does not have a centralized organization tasked with 
the analysis of medical intelligence from throughout the United States.  In addition, 
current intelligence fusion centers run the spectrum from no medical intelligence 
operations to well developed and integrated medical intelligence operations.  
Unfortunately, there are no set standards on what data is collected, analyzed, or 
disseminated.  The development of a domestic medical intelligence center is critical to 
the effective collection, integration, analysis, and dissemination of domestic medical 
intelligence data.       
This thesis will examine more than 100 different data points currently collected 
throughout almost 20 agencies or administrations that need to be integrated into one 
central domestic medical intelligence center.  This effort should begin with the 
 xiv
development of a national domestic medical intelligence center, managed by the 
Department of Homeland Security with close collaboration with a number of other 
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services and its various 
operational divisions, and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.  Much of the 
data already is being collected on a local, state, or federal level; however, there is no 
central analysis.  
As we move toward establishing such a system, we must ensure that all parties 
involved, including the general public, are informed of the methods of collection and 
dissemination, and that compliance with all pertinent federal and state laws is maintained 
throughout the operation.  In many cases, the federal government will not be the holder of 
raw data; however, it will receive aggregate, blinded data from state and local 
governments.  In these cases, communication among the federal, state, and local 
governments will be critical in the event that contact must be made with the patient.   
Once developed, this center will allow for the effective collection, integration, 
analysis, and dissemination of both tactical and strategic actionable intelligence for 
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and private sector partners.  These 
actions will assist in increasing our nation’s level of preparedness and improve our 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The concept of a medical intelligence center or a central collection point for such 
intelligence is not new.  The Department of Defense has been running the Armed Forces 
Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) for a number of years.  AFMIC collects a 
significant amount of medical intelligence on nations outside of the United States.  Data 
include various health and medical threats that personnel may face, clinical and research-
based medical capabilities, such as hospital capabilities and assorted research and 
developmental data, and recommended courses of action.  These data are extremely 
valuable to both medical and non-medical personnel and has an impact prior to, during, 
and after deployment.  Executive Order 12333 refers to the Department of Defense’s 
authority to collect foreign and military intelligence; however, it does not address the 
ability or assign responsibility for the collection of intelligence within the United States.  
Moreover, the field, and even concept, of medical intelligence is not well understood 
outside of military circles.  In the civilian sector, medical intelligence typically is 
interpreted to mean epidemiological data.  A majority of the literature within clinical and 
academic circles uses medical intelligence as a synonym for syndromic and disease 
surveillance, but the field encompasses much more than those epidemiological topics 
alone.  Even the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Pandemic 
Influenza Operations Plan released in December 2006 refers to medical intelligence as 
disease and syndromic surveillance data.1  Despite prior practice, medical intelligence 
goes well beyond syndromic and disease surveillance.  Joint Publication 1-02 defines 
medical intelligence (MEDINT) as: 
That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, 
analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and 
environmental information that is of interest to strategic planning and to 
military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the 
                                                 
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Pandemic Influenza Operations Plan  (Atlanta, GA: 
CDC, 2006), 117. 
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fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of 
foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors.2 
While military medical intelligence has been around for a number of years, 
domestic medical intelligence, beyond just syndromic and disease surveillance data, is 
new.  The United States does not currently have a domestic medical intelligence center 
that focuses on matters within the United States.  Currently, state and local fusion centers 
throughout the nation are attempting to fill the void by including limited medical 
intelligence functions in their day-to-day operations; however, most limit their data to 
syndromic and disease surveillance.  In addition, the level of inclusion in fusion center 
operations varies greatly center to center.  These vast differences, in conjunction with the 
lack of a common data set, imply that no effective nationwide common operating picture 
is available.  While the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is able to obtain 
AFMIC data for non-military and non-Department of Defense personnel deploying 
overseas, data are not available for medical personnel deploying throughout the United 
States.  During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, AFMIC did collect small amounts of data on 
the specific region affected along the Gulf Coast of the United States; however, 
dissemination of that data was not widespread enough to benefit all of the medical 
personnel within that theater of operations.  Federal medical teams such as the ones 
coordinated by the National Disaster Medical System have rarely had access to medical 
intelligence prior to or during an active deployment.   
The inability to have access to raw or analyzed data prior to an incident leads to a 
number of significant undesirable effects.  It is a waste of valuable time to have to collect 
and analyze data once medical teams already have been deployed.  Rapid analysis of a 
non-standardized data set presents a more difficult situation for assets in the field.  Teams 
are called upon to develop their data collection set at the time of the incident, in addition 
to conducting an analysis in a short amount of time.  In addition, data may change 
incident to incident, making the ability to compare operations from one deployment to the 
next more difficult.  From a public health perspective, the threats and hazards being faced 
                                                 
2. Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 336. 
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by both victims and responders typically are not discovered until days, weeks, or even 
months after the initial deployment.  This may put responders in the position of being 
exposed to potentially life-threatening hazards without adequate medical or 
pharmaceutical prophylaxis.  Even during pre-staged events, data collection has been 
done in the days or weeks prior to the event based on an ad-hoc data collection tool, as 
opposed to having a standardized data set for the entire United States.  During an active 
disaster, the ability to collect data is diminished significantly and analysis capabilities 
also are hindered.  For instance, during Hurricane Frances, when federal teams arrived in 
Florida, there was no available pre-assessment of local hospitals or an assessment of the 
water supply.  The local staff was assuming that the water was potable.  One of the 
federal response teams that happened to have an epidemiologist on board conducted an 
assessment of the situation and determined that the water was not safe for consumption.  
During large scale responses in which assets arrive from other jurisdictions, time that 
could be utilized treating patients must be dedicated to collecting information from local 
hospitals, including current bed capacity and epidemiologic information.  Much of this 
information can be collected in advance and provided to personnel prior to their 
deployment.  The Department of Defense has the ability to conduct similar assessments 
for personnel deploying overseas.  This allows the leadership to determine what hazards 
or threats will be faced by its personnel.  It also allows it to provide any pertinent 
vaccines and/or prophylaxis prior to deployment.  This thesis posits that a similar 
capability would be appreciated by national medical responders. 
The assumption that medical intelligence implies the creation of a federal 
repository of private medical records raises significant privacy concerns.  However, this 
is not the information gathering that is being proposed.  Gathering medical intelligence 
does not require or desire the use of individual private medical records.  Unfortunately, 
this misunderstanding has led many to be unwilling to consider the significant benefits of 
a domestic medical intelligence center. 
Aside from federal assets, with the expansion of the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, we see more states sharing assets directly with one another.  State 
and local governments, with the exception of National Guard and State Guard assets, are 
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unable to access any information collected and distributed by AFMIC.  Even if state and 
local governments were able to request and collect data by passing a request through the 
channels described in the National Response Plan, the data is focused on nations outside 
of the United States and would provide little to no benefit to the jurisdiction placing the 
request.  Some regions within a state or states themselves have begun to collect an initial 
set of data; however, the maintenance of the data becomes an issue, as does the 
standardization across state lines.  Natural, man-made, and technological disasters do not 
recognize political borders, and rapidly accessible, current, and standardized data are the 
key to a successful and safe operation. 
Within the civilian sector, no single agency has been tasked to collect and 
maintain this data.  Agencies throughout the government collect various components of 
the ideal data set, including the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Department of Homeland Security, as do many non-governmental agencies such 
as the American Hospital Association and other professional organizations.  The data 
from all of these agencies resides within their agencies alone and not in a central location.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does the United States need a domestic medical intelligence center for CONUS 
operations?  If so, what would be the ideal organizational structure?  What would be the 
key responsibilities of this organization?  What data would be collected? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature in the field of medical intelligence is sparse at best.  A review of 
current and past literature reveals a significant amount of literature related to general 
intelligence and public health, but little within the field of medical intelligence.  The 
limited number of sources on this specific topic that are available are based primarily on 
military documents and are specific to military operations.  A majority of the 
documentation is found within the Department of Defense, specifically the United States 
Navy and its Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence (POMI) program.  Documents 
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include manuals, training materials, and assorted other references.  Some of the 
documents are restricted to limited distribution while some are classified.   
The available literature can be grouped into three categories: public health, 
general intelligence, and medical intelligence. There are thousands of public health 
textbooks, journals, and published research projects in print and in cyberspace.  
Textbooks cover a wide variety of subjects, including introductions to public health in 
Introduction to Public Health by M. Schneider and Principles of Public Health Practice 
by F. Scutchfield and W. Keck, and specific fields such as forensic epidemiology in 
Forensic Epidemiology by S. Loue.  There are hundreds of peer-reviewed journals, 
including the Journal of Public Health Policy and the Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health.  There are hundreds of thousands of research projects in public 
health from all subfields, including epidemiology, community health, HIV/AIDS 
prevention, and a number of other subject areas.  Sources include undergraduate and 
graduate academic research, in addition to a wide variety of public and private 
organizations.  An exhaustive search of public health textbooks, journals, and research 
projects has yielded no relevant results.   
While not to the extent as that of public health, the field of intelligence has a 
number of textbooks and journals currently in circulation.  A majority of the 
documentation is generated by the Department of Defense, including field manuals, 
regulations, instructions, and other military-based documents.  The Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Interagency Operations Security Support Staff also produce a number of 
documents related to the history of the intelligence services, the world of covert 
operations, terrorist threats and information, and operations security of sensitive material.  
A majority of the documents either are classified or restricted to limited distribution.  In 
addition to governmental documents, there is a variety of academic and peer-reviewed 
literature available.  Textbooks, including Strategic Intelligence by L. Johnson and J. 
Wirtz and Silent Warfare by A. Shulsky and G. Schmitt, provide an in-depth overview of 
the intelligence community; however they do not discuss the specific field of medical 
intelligence.  There are a number of journals currently in circulation, including 
Intelligence and National Security and Studies in Intelligence. 
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The development of federal and in some cases state intelligence agencies or 
fusion centers is well documented.  Several resources discuss the development, 
reformation, and operations of a number of intelligence partners, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
the intelligence branches of the United States Army, United States Air Force, United 
States Navy, United States Coast Guard, and the United States Marine Corps.  In 
addition, fusion centers, such as the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, 
Illinois Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center, and the Georgia Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center, are documented frequently; however, detailed information is not 
readily available. 
The first reference to domestic medical intelligence was found in 2005.  In 
January 2005, Jeffrey Lowell, Senior Advisor for Medical Affairs to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Tom Ridge) published a report entitled Medical Readiness 
Responsibilities and Capabilities: A Strategy for Realigning and Strengthening the 
Federal Medical Response, which identified the need for a federal level medical 
intelligence organization.  Among other recommendations, Dr. Lowell recommended the 
appointment of an Assistant Secretary for Medical Readiness and the creation of a 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Medical Readiness.3 
The report did not address critical issues, such as what data would be collected 
and how the data would be initially collected and kept up to date.  In addition, since much 
of this data are currently collected by the states, we could continue with the current 
methodology of having the states collect the data and feed them into the larger collective.  
This method currently is in use by many different federal agencies for a multitude of non-
medical initiatives.  Since a vast majority of the data collected would be at the 
unclassified level, subsequent report generation and information dissemination is not an 
issue.  While some data most likely would have to be classified, all attempts should be 
made to limit the number of classified reports, while maximizing the utilization of open 
source intelligence. 
                                                 
3. Medical Readiness Responsibilities and Capabilities: A Strategy for Realigning and Strengthening 
the Federal Medical Response (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 5. 
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Within academia, a review of a number of undergraduate and graduate programs 
within the field of intelligence yields no programs that dedicate a course to medical 
intelligence.  The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center provides training and 
education to its staff and partners through a self-learning document entitled, “Medical 
Intelligence Tutorial,” and utilizes existing general intelligence programs, including the 
National Defense Intelligence College, for hands-on training and education.  In addition, 
a review of a large number of public health programs reveals that none of them offer a 
course on intelligence operations related to public health.  In addition to a void in existing 
programs, there does not appear to be any current planning for a course of this nature.   
There is little academic, peer-reviewed literature on the specific field of domestic 
medical intelligence and, indeed, literature related specifically to medical intelligence is 
virtually non-existent. Existing references discuss only one or two small components of a 
medical intelligence system but do not tie the various pieces together.  The existing 
military documentation is not directly applicable to domestic and domestic medical 
intelligence operations. 
A top government official has identified the need for such a focus, yet no formal 
resolution has been presented.  In order to streamline our nation’s health care emergency 
response capabilities effectively, significant changes must occur. 
D. ARGUMENT 
In January 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a National Infectious 
Disease Threat Report (NIE 99-17D).  The report stated that: 
New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health 
threat and will complicate security, both nationally and globally, over the 
next twenty years. These diseases will endanger United States citizens at 
home [the NIE does not define what it means by ‘at home’] and abroad, 
threaten United States armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate 
social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the 
United States has significant interests.4   
                                                 
4. Central Intelligence Agency, National Infectious Disease Threat Report, NIE 99-17D (Washington, 
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000), 5. 
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This threat is growing and will continue to grow in the decades to come.  The 
threat was identified multiple times throughout the 1990s5,6 and continued into the new 
millennium after the anthrax attacks of 2001, the smallpox threat of the early twenty-first 
century, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in the Far East and 
Canada, and the current influenza pandemic concerns.  Speaking at the 2005 World 
Economic Forum, United States Senate Majority Leader William Frist stated that “I 
believe we will see a major biological attack sometime within the next ten years.”7  It is 
unknown what, if any, intelligence reports Senator Frist was referring to as the basis for 
his comment.  While the threat itself is largely indisputable, the question as to whether 
current terrorist organizations possess the ability to cause widespread morbidity and 
mortality varies group by group.   
Due to the nature of man-made and naturally occurring biological threats, we will 
never be able to guarantee a complete absence of such a threat.  In January 2003, former 
Secretary Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of Homeland Security, stated that the United 
States “cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a terrorist attack.”8  We need to 
ensure that we have prepared and mitigated the threat to the best of our abilities and 
equipped and trained our nation to respond in the event that the inevitable happens.  One 
of the key gaps in our current ability to accomplish this effectively is the lack of a 
domestic medical intelligence center that focuses specifically on domestic medical 
intelligence.  As we have seen in the past, fusion centers and other homeland security 
programs and projects are initiated in response to a potential threat.  We also have seen 
the need to shift from a post-event or post-threat response to a pre-event and pre-threat 
response.  The development of a domestic medical intelligence center, not unlike fusion 
centers, needs to be accomplished prior to their need, not after.  The time and funding 
                                                 
5. Annette Flanagin and Joshua Lederberg, “The Threat of Biological Weapons – Prophylaxis and 
Mitigation.” Journal of the American Medical Association 276 (1996): 419–420. 
6. Joan Stephenson, “Confronting a Biological Armageddon: Experts Tackle Prospect of 
Bioterrorism.” Journal of the American Medical Association 276 (1996): 349-352. 
7. World Economic Forum, Biological Threats to Societies (Davos: World Economic Forum, 2005) 
http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledge/KN_SESS_SUMM_13593?url=/en/knowledge/KN_SESS_SUMM
_13593 (Accessed December 2006). 
8. Deborah Charles, “Ridge Tells United States Enemies ‘We Are Coming After You,’” Rense, n.d. 
http://www.rense.com/general34/coming.htm (Accessed December 2006) 
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required to develop both fusion centers and a domestic medical intelligence center in a 
true joint matter is extensive and should not be done without appropriate strategic and 
operational planning. 
In addition to the threat from man-made or terrorist-based biological agents, the 
potentially even larger threat stems from naturally occurring pathogens that either are 
reemerging or becoming resistant to current pharmacological interventions.  The dangers 
of drug resistant tuberculosis and Staphylococcus aureus, malaria, and even human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-related complications are growing annually.  The increase 
in resistant strains poses a threat to public health during day-to-day and large scale 
incident responses.  These threats have existed for a number of years and will continue to 
grow in the future.  While not currently on the media forefront in comparison to 
bioterrorism and influenza pandemic, the casualties resulting from these pathogens could, 
over the course of a few years, be equal to or greater than that of a bioterrorism attack.  
Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, has identified 
emerging biological threats, both man-made and natural, and their subsequent global 
economic and social consequences to be of global significance.9  While the World Health 
Organization does collect syndromic and disease surveillance data from participating 
nations, it does not expand its medical intelligence functions beyond the identification of 
emerging threats.   
Currently, there is no method for responders from other jurisdictions to collect 
and analyze medical intelligence and health care capability and capacity data without 
doing so after arrival at the scene of an incident.  Typically, since mutual aid may arrive 
12 or more hours post-incident, assets may arrive with patients already in line awaiting 
treatment.  Assigning personnel to this task takes away from potential clinical treatment 
of patients.   
Given the growing threat, the need for a domestic medical intelligence center now 
is more critical than ever.  We have heard a wide variety of officials advise us that the 
                                                 
9. Margaret Chan, “Keynote Address at 120th WHO Executive Board Session” (Speech, Geneva, 
January 22, 2006), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2007/eb120_opening/en/index.html (Accessed January 
2007). 
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question essentially is not whether we are going to have a large scale biological event; 
rather, the question is when it will occur.10,11,12  In order for us to respond to a large scale 
biological event, it is critical that we know what assets we have, how they will be 
coordinated, and how we will sustain a prolonged operation.13  Various sectors that have  
traditionally been deemed the “first responders” throughout our nation—the fire service, 
law enforcement, and emergency medical services—slowly have realized the importance 
of the other health care and public health partners.  In addition, the private sector has 
realized the potential economic impact if the public health system is unable to manage a 
response to a biological event.  It has realized that the safety of its workforce and its 
ability to maintain adequate staffing are related directly to a strong public health 
response.  The lack of a well coordinated health care and public health response will have 
widespread effects on almost every other critical sector.   
The general intelligence community has taken decades to evolve into the current 
system, which is a loosely federated group of independent agencies that has the capability 
and common culture to produce national intelligence products for federal, state, and local 
consumption.  In order for medical intelligence centers to become active partners in the 
intelligence community, a number of well calculated steps will have to take place.  
In order for such a center to be effective, it must address a wide spectrum of 
medical intelligence issues, not only syndromic and disease surveillance.  An additional 
success factor is the ability to work closely with partners at the local, state, and federal 
levels.  The federal government is not in a position to have intimate knowledge of what is 
occurring at the local and state levels.  Similarly, unlike the federal government, the state 
                                                 
10. Betsy Querna, “Avian Flu: ‘We’re screwed if it hits soon,’” US News and World Report, June 16, 
2005. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/050616/16avian.htm?track=rss (Accessed December 
2006). 
11. Lara Jordan, “Another Attack Isn’t a Matter of If, but When,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, 
September 9, 2006. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/sept11/20060909-0915-sept11-
anotherattack.html (Accessed December 2006). 
12. PY Lam, Emerging Disease Crisis Management: Regulatory Challenges (Geneva: WHO, n.d). 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/icdra/crisisman.pdf (Accessed 
December 2006). 
13. R. Roos, “CIDRAP News WHO Issues Rapid Response Plan for Flu Pandemic,” CIDRAP, January 
27, 2006. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/jan2706contain.html (Accessed 
January 2007). 
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and local governments may not have the resources to respond independently and 
effectively to an incident.  This makes the requirement for effective coordination that 
much more critical.  While vertical cooperation is important, so is horizontal cooperation 
at the local, state, and federal levels.  Local and state agencies must open lines of 
communication with non-traditional partners.  Amongst federal agencies, the center must 
become an integral partner in the existing intelligence community.  Comprehensive 
situational awareness by all partners, at all levels, will allow for the rapid identification of 
potential hazards before they occur or shortly after they occur, thereby helping to 
decrease the overall morbidity and mortality of the event. 
Data are being collected by local and state public health departments on a daily 
basis.  These data however are being collected and assessed in stovepipes.  Ideally, data 
should be synchronized and analyzed on state, regional, and federal levels.  Access to 
data outside the local health department should not include any patient-specific or patient 
identification data.  This would address patient privacy concerns that may be raised.  
Patient privacy issues must be in the forefront throughout all phases of development, 
implementation, and operation of a domestic medical intelligence center.  Historically, 
the general public has had negative views of the government collecting what it felt was 
confidential medical data.  Unbeknownst to many, the disease and syndromic 
surveillance systems in place throughout the nation collect general data on a daily basis 
and forward it regularly to epidemiologists at state health departments.  These data are 
blinded, but allow the health departments to identify potential outbreaks and disease 
trends before they become widespread.  The health departments that collect the data do 
not know who the patients are.  Many areas, such as the National Capital Region, have 
the ability to view aggregate data from a larger area; however, detailed data are available 
only within each jurisdiction.  While the data do not contain identifiers, the system does 
allow agencies, in cooperation with the reporting agencies, to trace the data back to the 
individual patient for their own safety.  In the event that an outbreak is detected, it would 
be vital that all individuals who presented with those potential symptoms were treated as 
soon as possible. 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Due to the significant void in available literature on the topic of medical 
intelligence, this research may serve as a central collection point for the various 
components of a domestic medical intelligence system.  Thus, it will contribute data and 
analysis to a field of research that still is largely in its infancy.  In addition, it will justify 
the need for the establishment of a domestic medical intelligence center along with the 
potential initial organizational structure.  This will, in turn, assist in increasing the overall 
level of public health emergency preparedness in the nation against man-made and 
naturally occurring biological hazards. 
Government, and particularly health officials and public health emergency 
preparedness directors at all levels of government, should find this research beneficial to 
both their day-to-day health care emergency preparedness planning efforts and their 
planning efforts for large-scale responses.  Government officials tasked with developing 
the federal government’s preparedness and planning initiatives should find this research 
advantageous in establishing the initial concept of operations.   
F. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology utilized includes a case study of related systems in the 
Department of Defense and at various intelligence fusion centers in the United States, in 
addition to a qualitative analysis of each of those systems.  In addition to interviewing 
senior staff from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health Affairs, this 
study will present a model for a domestic medical intelligence center.  The research will 
also propose a set of data points to be collected, based upon currently collected medical 
intelligence data as reported by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, and a 
needs assessment conducted by the District of Columbia Department of Health in relation 
to its participation in the Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center.   
The organizational model presented will be based upon an analysis of existing 
medical intelligence operations at the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, the 
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Department of Homeland Security, the Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center, and the 
Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group.   
The proposed model will be presented in a format that will allow for additional 
and more detailed planning.  Financial aspects of establishing such a center will be 
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II. HISTORY OF MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 
A. MILITARY HISTORY 
The history of medical intelligence in the United States military can be traced 
back to World War II; however, the need for and use of medical intelligence actually can 
be identified as far back as the Peloponnesian War.  The United States Army was the first 
home of medical intelligence within the Office of the Surgeon General’s Preventive 
Medicine Division.  In September 1940, responsibility for medical intelligence for the 
United States Army was transitioned over to the Army Medical Department.  In 1944, the 
medical intelligence function was recognized formally as a branch within the Preventive 
Medicine Division.14  This allowed the Medical Intelligence Branch to distribute 
information both for planning purposes and for units that may be deployed in various 
theaters of operation.  It also was during World War II that the United States Army 
modified its internal definition of medical intelligence from being solely directed at its 
own soldiers to the collection of information regarding foreign medical capabilities.   
In the late 1940s, the Central Intelligence Agency began to take an interest in 
medical intelligence.  Its interest was related primary to science and technology issues in 
foreign nations; however, it began to discuss the possibility of the Central Intelligence 
Agency serving as the key agency to coordinate all medical intelligence programs.  
Before it had the opportunity to do so, the Secretary of Defense in 1948 established the 
“Ad Hoc Committee on Medical and Hospital Services” within the Department of 
Defense.  Commonly known as the “Hawley Board,” for its chairman retired Major 
General Paul Hawley,15 it comprised a number of subcommittees, including a 
subcommittee on medical intelligence.  This subcommittee filed a report within six 
months recommending the development of the “Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
                                                 
14. United States Army, “Developments in Military Medicine During the Administration of Surgeon 
General Norman T. Kirk,” http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/DvlpmntsinMilMed.htm 
(Accessed July 10, 2007). 
15. Jonathan Clemente, “The Fate of an Orphan: The Hawley Board and the Debates over the Postwar 
Organization of Medical Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (June 2005): 267. 
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Organization.”  This agency would coordinate efforts among the United States Army, 
United States Navy, and the United States Air Force.  While housed within the 
Department of Defense, this agency also would support the needs of other federal 
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency.  The recommendation by the 
subcommittee was accepted by the Hawley Board later that year.   
However, this was not the end of a long and arduous battle surrounding military 
medical intelligence.  The recommendation of the Hawley Board was not well received 
by the intelligence community, and the United States Government embarked on a multi-
year journey to find the appropriate home for medical intelligence.  Subsequently, in 
1954, the Army Surgeon General accepted the recommendations of the “Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Medical Intelligence” and established the Medical Information and 
Intelligence Division within the Office of the Surgeon General.   
Through a number of transformations, including the United States Army Medical 
Intelligence and Information Agency, the latest iteration of a medical intelligence 
function within the military can be seen within the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center (AFMIC).  AFMIC was created in 1982 as a tri-service organization focused on 
foreign medical intelligence operations.  In 1992, through the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, AFMIC was transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency and 
became a Defense Intelligence Agency Field Production Activity.  According to 
Department of Defense Directive 6420.1, dated 09 October 2004, AFMIC has four main 
missions:16 
• Acting as the focal point in the Department of Defense for compiling all-
source intelligence and producing finished intelligence on foreign military 
and civilian medical capabilities, to include the health status of foreign 
military forces, infectious disease and environmental health risks, and 
scientific and technical developments in biotechnology and biomedical 
subjects of military importance.  
                                                 
16. Department of Defense Directive 6420.1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 
2004), Section 3.2. 
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• Producing and distributing medical intelligence products and assessments 
in support of the Department of Defense components. 
• Managing the medical aspects of the Department of Defense Materiel 
Program. 
• Accomplishing such other production assignments as are tasked by the 
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. 
Historically, AFMIC has been focused solely on operations outside of the 
continental United States; however, during the recent Department of Defense response to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, AFMIC did provide an overview of health issues in support of 
Department of Defense personnel assigned to Joint Task Force Katrina. 
As previously mentioned, the Department of Defense, through the Armed Forces 
Medical Intelligence Center, collects, analyzes, and disseminates medical intelligence to 
Department of Defense assets and partners around the globe.  Despite its expertise and 
ability to conduct such intelligence operations, it currently is extremely limited in its 
ability to collect data within the United States.  While the role of the United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is evolving, it is unknown whether its mission 
will begin to involve medical intelligence operations within the United States.  This 
severely limits the ability of our responders to respond effectively and manage any large-
scale incident.  
B. CIVILIAN HISTORY 
Traditionally, public health personnel have limited the concept of medical 
intelligence to syndromic and disease surveillance systems.  There is little to no inclusion 
of the myriad of other public health emergency preparedness systems that are in use on a 
daily basis.  For instance, while there is some literature surrounding general disease or 
syndromic surveillance systems and systems maintained by the federal government, there 
is little literature about school nurse-based reporting systems.  In addition, discussions 
surrounding public health based radiation safety programs and public health management 
of large-scale incidents is extremely limited.  This shortsightedness has contributed to a 
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slower forward progression in this vital field.  While the design and organization of 
public health departments varies drastically state by state and city by city, data that could 
be collected by a medical intelligence center would provide important insights, regardless 
of the system’s design.   
States throughout the nation, in addition to the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, collect, 
analyze, and report on disease and medical surveillance data on a daily basis; however, 
their investigations are limited primarily to disease and syndromic surveillance data.   
Currently, one of the major “threats” facing the nation, and the world, is that of an 
influenza pandemic.  While this may be a viable threat at this time, it appears that every 
few years we are preparing for an event involving some type of biological agent, either 
man-made or those that occur naturally.  Despite this ever present threat, we cannot 
accurately list the number of available hospitals beds in the nation at any given time.  
While the United States Department of Health and Human Services currently is in the 
process of implementing a system to analyze bed capacity throughout the nation, it still is 
years away from implementation.  In addition, beds are only the tip of the iceberg in 
relation to medical surge capacity planning efforts.  Without the appropriate staff, 
equipment, and supplies, the beds themselves are useless.  There are a number of 
“independent analysis cells” that collect and analyze incoming data in a wide variety of 
potential subject areas.  Unfortunately, the data are not reported to other agencies either 
in detail or aggregate.   
In addition, there is no single central analytic cell to help put all of the pieces of 
the puzzle together.  The identification of one unusual event within the larger data set 
may not be an issue; however, when coupled with one or two unusual incidents within the 
same timeframe or geographic area, it may be a cause for concern.  While a limited 
number of intelligence fusion centers throughout the nation have begun utilizing medical 
intelligence analysts within their organizations, many are isolated from a vast majority of 
the intelligence data being reviewed or have limited their participation solely to 
syndromic and disease surveillance.   
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Unfortunately, when dealing with biologic threats, retrospective analysis is not the 
most effective method of analysis.  Delays in the identification of a biological agent in 
the United States or en route to the United States can have grave consequences.  In order 
to limit the spread of disease and the subsequent morbidity and mortality, we must 
decrease the time needed to identify a harmful pathogen and monitor potential threats 
throughout the globe.  The development of a domestic medical intelligence center can 
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III. EXISTING MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  
A. ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
1. Organizational Design 
The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) currently is organized 
within the Defense Intelligence Agency and located at Fort Detrick in Maryland.  AFMIC 
has an extensive history in medical intelligence operations overseas; however, it performs 
limited operations within the United States.  AFMIC’s mission statement states that it 
shall “produce finished, all-source, medical intelligence in support of the Department of 
Defense and its components, national policy officials, and other federal agencies.  
Assessments, forecasts, and databases are prepared on foreign military and civilian 
medical systems, foreign infections disease risks, foreign environmental health risks, and 
foreign life sciences and biotechnology.”17 
AFMIC, which performs a wide variety of functions in relation to medical 
intelligence and force health protection matters, is divided into five primary divisions: 
programs and operations, infectious disease, medical capabilities, environmental health, 
and medical science and technology, as seen in Figure 1.  While many of AFMIC’s 
functions should be replicated in a domestic medical intelligence center, many would not.  
Some of AFMIC’s key functions are described in table 1.  They include extensive 
collection and analysis of science and technology issues in addition to the health status of 
foreign leaders, the latter in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency’s Medical 
and Psychological Analysis Center.  These functions would not necessarily have to be 
utilized within the United States, as the first is tracked by the Department of Health and 
Human Services in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security during 
critical infrastructure assessments and analysis.  
                                                 
17. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center Brochure (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
October 2003), 2.  
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Figure 1.   AFMIC Organizational Chart (16 Oct 06). [About Armed Forces Medical 
Intelligence Center http://mic.afmic.detrick.army.mil/]. 
 
2. Staffing 
Staffing within AFMIC is a combination of military and civilian employees with 
contractor support.  As a tri-service agency, AFMIC has military personnel from the 
United States Army, United States Air Force, and the United States Navy.  AFMIC 
utilizes a variety of clinical and non-clinical personnel to collect, analyze, and report on 
data.  In addition to personnel who are assigned permanently to AFMIC, some personnel 




would expect in such a center, AFMIC is extensively involved in simulation and 
modeling activities and is always attempting to stay on the leading edge of information 
delivery methods and systems. 
 
Assessment of foreign military and civilian medical capabilities, 
including treatment facilities, medical personnel, emergency and 
disaster response, logistics, and medical/pharmaceutical industries 
Medical 
Capabilities 
Maintenance and updating of an integrated database on all medical 
treatment, training, pharmaceutical, and research and production 
facilities 
Identification and assessment of environmental risks that can degrade 
force health or effectiveness, including chemical and microbial 
contamination of the environment, toxic industrial, chemical and 
radiation accidents, and environmental terrorism/warfare 
Environmental 
Health Assessment of the impact of foreign environmental health issues and trends on environmental security and national policy 
Identification, assessment, and reporting on infectious disease risks that 
can degrade mission effectiveness of deployed forces and/or cause long-
term health implications 
Infectious 
Disease Alert operational and policy customers to foreign disease outbreaks that 
have implications for national security and policy formulation, including 
homeland defense and deliberately introduced versus naturally occurring 
disease outbreaks. 
Assessment of foreign basic and applied biomedical and 
biotechnological developments of military medical importance 
Assessment of foreign civilian and military pharmaceutical industry 
capabilities 
Assessment of foreign scientific and technological medical advances for 
defense against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare 




Prevention of proliferation of dual-use equipment and knowledge 
Table 1.   Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) Functions. 
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3. Data Collection and Reporting 
AFMIC customers can receive assessments based on their own requirements.  
While AFMIC excels at providing information related to force protection issues, its 
ability to provide tactical intelligence is limited.  In addition to some standardized 
reports, AFMIC responds to individual requests for information and can provide 
responses via telephone, fax, or e-mail in both classified and unclassified formats.  In 
addition, AFMIC regularly distributes a CD-ROM known as MEDIC (Medical, 
Environmental, Disease, Intelligence, and Countermeasures).  AFMIC maintains web 
sites on the non-classified Internet protocol router network (NIPRNET), secret Internet 
protocol router network (SIPRNET), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS), thereby having the capability of providing 
information via the web at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels.  AFMIC’s key 
medical intelligence products include:18 
a. Medical, Environmental, Disease Intelligence, and Countermeasures 
(MEDIC) - provides worldwide infectious disease and environmental 
health risks hyperlinked to the Joint Service-approved countermeasure 
recommendations, military and civilian health care delivery capabilities, 
operational information, disease vector ecology information, and reference 
data.  
b. Health Services Assessment (HSA) - provides consumers the bottom-line 
assessment of a country’s health services capability. 
c. Infectious Disease Risk Assessment (IDRA) - pre-deployment force 
protection planning guidance that assesses the baseline risk from 
infectious diseases of operational military significance on a country-by-
country basis worldwide. 
                                                 
18. Department of Defense, “Defense Intelligence Agency – Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center,” https://afmicuweb.afmic.detrick.army.mil/index.php (Accessed July 20, 2007). 
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d. Environmental Health Risk Assessment (EHRA) - assesses 
environmental health risks of operational military significance on a 
country-by-country basis worldwide.  
e. Infectious Disease Alert formerly known as the Disease Occurrence 
Worldwide (DOWW) - short, timely alerts that assess risk to U.S. forces 
from foreign disease outbreaks that may impact military operations, and 
forecast disease risks associated with recent environmental disasters. 
f. Industrial Facility Health Risk Assessment (IFHRA) - assesses health 
risks associated with potential exposure to toxic industrial chemicals at 
specific industrial facilities worldwide. 
g. Industry Sector Profile (ISP) - assesses potential environmental and 
human health impacts related to routine emissions and large-scale 
chemical releases from industrial activities by the industrial sector. 
h. Facility Health Based Prioritization (FHBP) - provides a country-by-
country prioritization of industrial facilities based on potential exposure to 
toxic industrial chemicals and expected adverse health effects. 
i. Life Sciences and Biotechnology - assesses foreign basic and applied 
biomedical and biotechnological developments of military medical 
importance, foreign civilian and military pharmaceutical industry 
capabilities, and foreign scientific and technological medical advances for 
defense against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warfare.  
j. Medical Intelligence Note (MIN) - provides a brief assessment of 
important medical developments to meet time-sensitive requirements for 
support to medical planning and decision-making, as well as materiel 





B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
1. Organizational Design 
The Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2002, bringing 22 separate 
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Figure 2.   Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart (Pre-2004). [About 
Department of Homeland Security 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_Org_Chart-2003.ppt]. 
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As the agency continued to mature, grow, and reorganize (see Figure 3), it soon 
realized the need to have the capability to provide health and medical advice to the 
Secretary for the planning, preparedness, and response to incidents of national 
significance (INS).  During the Second Stage Review conducted shortly after the arrival 
of Secretary Michael Chertoff in 2005, the need for the development of an Office of 
Health Affairs (see Figure 4) was identified.  The Office of Health Affairs is led by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Office of Health Affairs, who also holds the title of Chief 
Medical Officer.   
Since the United States Department of Health and Human Services is the lead for 
Emergency Support Function #8, some feel that the development of an Office of Health 
Affairs within the Department of Homeland Security may cause additional undue 
conflict.19   
In order for a domestic medical intelligence center to be effective, it must develop 
and maintain effective working relationships with a number of other agencies on a 
federal, regional, state, and local level.  One of the key relationships is with the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  Since the Department of Homeland Security 
has defined its role as non-competitive in nature,20 many individuals have a hard time 
understanding the differentiation in roles between these two agencies.  While the existing 
relationship is clear to some, it remains unclear to others, and additional clarification will 
be necessary.  
                                                 
19. Senior state and federal public health emergency preparedness officials, conversations with author, 
Washington, DC, Spring 2007.  All conversations were in confidence and the names of individuals are 
withheld by mutual agreement.   


























































































Figure 3.   Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart (01 Apr 07). [About 
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Figure 4.   DHS Office of Health Affairs Organizational Chart. [About Department of 





The Office of Health Affairs is organized into four primary areas: international 
affairs and global health security, weapons of mass destruction and biodefense, medical 
readiness, and component services.  The latter two functional areas are run by an 
Associate Chief Medical Officer, while the second is run by a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary.  The Office of Health Affairs has grown from its initial staff of three in the fall 
of 2005 (originally called the Office of the Chief Medical Officer) to a request for 49 full-
time equivalent employees for fiscal year 2008.21  Currently, the Office of Health Affairs 
comprises a combination of career federal employees, United States Public Health 
Service commissioned officers, academic staff, and subject matter experts through 
Interagency Personnel Agreements, contractor support, detailees from the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and, effective 01 
September2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.22 
3. Data Collection and Reporting 
The Department of Homeland Security currently produces a number of health 
care and public health documents, including critical infrastructure reports and threat 
assessments. The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) 
sector assessments discuss the current threats to each sector, including health care and 
public health, and provide a brief analysis of each threat.  While these, and similar, 
documents do provide a type of medical intelligence, they serve as only one component 
of the overall medical intelligence picture.  However, the reports do not include a 
majority of the data points described in this proposal. 
One of the key entities within the Office of Health Affairs responsible for the 
collection of medical intelligence data is the National Biosurveillance Integration System 
                                                 
21. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement for the Record Jeffrey W. Runge, MD Chief 
Medical Officer Office of Health Affairs before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security Bioterrorism Preparedness and Role of DHS Chief 
Medical Officer,” http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1175280009133.shtm [Accessed April 
15, 2007]. 
22. Smith  interview. 
 30
(NBIS).  NBIS is a relatively new organization that is evolving constantly.  This office is 
responsible for the integration and analysis of biosurveillance data from a wide variety of 
sources, including agricultural, public health, and biodefense arenas.  However, due to 
the large number of partner agencies involved in this undertaking, it has not come 
without its share of challenges.  Some of the key challenges include the lack of a large 
number of subject matter experts, a limited pool of operatives on the ground conducting 
information collection, and the perception, while not an accurate one, of DHS attempting 
to participate in missions traditionally held by other governmental agencies.  While there 
are intentionally no intelligence personnel assigned to NBIS, they work closely with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence and Analysis Office and utilize them as 
their link into the rest of the intelligence community.  
C. METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON FUSION CENTER (WASHINGTON, 
DC) 
1. Organizational Design 
The Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center (MWFC) is a collaborative effort 
among the Metropolitan Police Department, District of Columbia Fire and EMS Agency, 
District of Columbia Department of Health, District of Columbia Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management Agency, District Department of Transportation, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Department of Defense, and other local, regional, and federal partners.  
The center is designed as a multidisciplinary group with the current project manager 
being provided by the Metropolitan Police Department.  While the project manager is 
supplied by the Metropolitan Police Department, the actual oversight and governance of 
the center is conducted by a multi-agency governance board.   
2. Staffing 
The Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center has been divided into two initial 
groups.  The first group is responsible for the development of the fusion center; the latter 
includes additional agencies that will be involved in the operations of the fusion center 
once it is developed and made operational.   
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Staff at the MWFC will consist of a combination of federal, district, state, local, 
and military personnel, with additional contractor support as necessary.    
3. Data Collection and Reporting 
During the initial stages of the fusion center, data collection and reporting is 
conducted based upon a variety of open source reports, reports from other fusion centers 
throughout the nation, and federal and military sources.  Information is collected and 
analyzed on a daily basis and disseminated to partners as part of the Daily Summary.  As 
the fusion center continues to evolve, the identified data streams within the District and 
the National Capital Region will be fed into the fusion center for inclusion in the daily 
summaries.  In the field of medical intelligence, more than twenty data sources will be 
fed into the fusion center for analysis, sharing, and reporting purposes.  The data fields 
currently identified are discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  These data will be provided 
back to the Department of Health in an analyzed format, along with information being 
presented to the other fusion center partners for their awareness and inclusion in the daily 
summaries.  In addition to daily reports, the fusion center staff have the ability to develop 
reports, briefings, and other information products based on emerging threats, acts of 
terrorism both domestic and internationally, and other tailored reports requested by fusion 
center partners. 
D. LOS ANGELES TERRORISM EARLY WARNING GROUP 
1. Organizational Design 
The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), designed by Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department deputies John Sullivan and Larry Richards, was essentially 
the predecessor to what is currently known as an intelligence fusion center.  The TEW 
was created in the fall of 1996 and consisted of representatives from the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the California Office of Emergency Services, the city and county of Los 
Angeles fire departments, the Department of Health Services, and several representatives 
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from assorted academic and research institutions.  The relationships among members of 
the TEW, as with most networked relationships, have taken years to develop.   
As the TEW evolved, it added additional partners, including the various local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies, the National Guard, the United States Coast 
Guard, and various emergency management agencies, fire departments, transportation 
authorities, universities, and airports.  The TEW comprises six integrated cells: Forensic 
Intelligence Support, Epidemiological Intelligence, Analysis/Synthesis, Consequence 
Management, Investigative Liaison, and the Officer-in-Charge.  The organization of the 
six cells can be seen in Figure 5.  For the purposes of this analysis, examination of the 
integrated cells will be limited to those with a medical intelligence-related function.   
The Epidemiological Intelligence Cell conducts medical intelligence operations, 
including disease surveillance, analysis of food, water, and agricultural issues, isolation 
and quarantine issues, and medical surge capacity issues.  In addition, the 
















Figure 5.   TEW Organizational Chart.23 
 
                                                 
23. M. Grossman, “Perception of Fact: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Early Warning 
(TEW) Group” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 22. 
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Data; however it has identified the need to expand its current capabilities in this area.24  
The TEW has been cited in many sources25,26,27 as a promising practice in the field of 
intelligence fusion. 
2. Staffing 
The management of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group follows a 
unified command structure, in that there is no single organization designated as the lead.  
The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department serves as the primary logistical body, assisting 
with the scheduling and execution of the TEW’s operational needs including training, 
communications, and housing.  Each of the six cells is staffed by subject matter experts 
from the fields represented by the TEW’s membership.  Clinical staff at the TEW 
consists of both physicians and nurses.  In addition, paramedics also are located at the 
TEW; however, they are located within the Consequence Management cell. 
In addition to the staff assigned to the TEW, Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) 
also are trained and utilized throughout the region.  There are TLOs for a variety of 
functions, including health care and public health.  Each agency involved designates a 
TLO and this individual serves as the primary point of contact for all terrorism-related 
information.  The TEW has developed a training program for all TLOs and encourages 
them to share information that they receive or notice that may be helpful to the TEW.   
 
 
                                                 
24. John Sullivan, “Integrated Threat and Net Assessment: The L.A. Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) 
Group Model” (presented at the RAND National Security Research Division Bioterrorism Symposium, 
California, February 8–10, 2000).  
25. Siobhan Gorman, “Efforts to combat nuclear terrorism hindered by porous borders,” Government 
Executive. http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=31519&ref=rellink (Accessed June 24, 
2007). 
26. Neal Pollard, Terrorism Early Warning Group: A Concept for Emergency Responder Information 
Sharing and Intelligence Fusion (Washington, DC, Terrorism Research Center, 2003). 
27. Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: 
n.p., December 14, 2000). 
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3. Data Collection and Reporting 
Data is collected through a wide variety of sources, including the organizations 
represented on the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (see Figure 6).  In 
regard to medical intelligence, data collection appears to be limited to disease 
surveillance, animal surveillance, food and water surety data, medical surge, and 
agricultural issues. 
In addition to standard reports, which follow an internal approval process prior to 
dissemination to authorized personnel, the TEW has begun designing playbooks for a 
variety of different scenarios.  The TEW already has completed a playbook for biological 
events28 and hopes to continue to develop additional playbooks in the future. 
                                                 
28. John Sullivan, “Integrated Threat and Net Assessment: The L.A. Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) 
Group Model” (presented at the RAND National Security Research Division Bioterrorism Symposium, 
California, February 8–10, 2000). 
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Figure 6.   Los Angeles TEW Epidemiological Intelligence Cell. [About Grossman, 







As these examples have shown, the breadth and scope of medical intelligence 
varies greatly organization to organization.  Some agencies limit medical intelligence to 
disease and syndromic surveillance while others include a wide variety of data fields and 
sources.  This is one of the first challenges that needs to be addressed.  Agencies 
throughout the nation involved in domestic medical intelligence must establish the 
general scope of domestic medical intelligence.  From there, the development of a 
common set of definitions for the various data sets, in addition to establishing the data set 
itself, is essential.   
The sharing of information and report dissemination methods range significantly, 
from web-based reporting and CD-ROM-based data sources to no reporting at all.  The 
number of partner agencies actively involved in specific medical intelligence duties also 
ranges widely.   
These examples provide a plethora of lessons learned when examining the 
establishment of a medical intelligence center, both what one should do and what one 
should avoid.  One critical step is determining who will serve as the key partners.  In 
addition, we must assess what already is collected and what is currently available.  Just 
because data is being collected by an agency or entity does not mean that it would 
necessarily be available to another agency for integration or analysis.  Further review and 
analysis of all four of these operations will be required as the plans for development of a 
domestic medical intelligence center move forward.  Some of the key lessons to be 
learned are the early identification of the center’s mission space and the need to avoid 
mission creep.  In regard to reporting, we must make sure that the reports meet the needs 
of the end user and provide actionable intelligence.  Reports for the sake of reporting are 
a waste of time and effort on all sides.  Essentially, key issues surround not only the 
personnel and data but the network and system in which they exist.   
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A DOMESTIC MEDICAL 
INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
A, LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Existing Legislation 
A review of existing state and federal legislation reveals legislation containing the 
words “medical” and “intelligence” only on a federal level.  There does not appear to be 
any legislation specifically addressing medical intelligence on a state or local level.  In 
addition to federal legislation, the federal government had a number of Department of 
Defense directives, Presidential Executive Orders, and other federal documents that 
discuss or govern medical intelligence operations on a federal level.  None appear to be 
applicable to state and local governments. 
2. Proposed Legislation 
A review of legislation currently proposed on a local, state, and federal level 
yielded negative results.   
3. Necessary Legislation 
Legislation will be necessary to initiate a domestic medical intelligence center.  In 
addition, legislation surrounding medical intelligence will require a multifaceted 
capability to collect and analyze a combination of clinical and non-clinical data.  This 
will require adequate planning to prevent significant backlash from the general public.  
Legislation for the collection of domestic medical intelligence must be limited in scope to 
prevent the possibility of the intelligence being utilized for ulterior motives within the 
law enforcement and legal systems.  However, at the same time there is a need to ensure 
that sufficient, blinded data can be collected in order for the intelligence center to be 
useful.  Legislation on state, local, tribal, and territorial levels will need to be developed, 
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in addition to federal legislation.  If legislation is initially generated on a federal level, it 
may assist state, local, tribal, and territorial governments in drafting theirs subsequently. 
B. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
1. Where Does It Belong? 
A number of issues need to be discussed regarding the development of a domestic 
medical intelligence center; however, none may be more critical or political than deciding 
which Department within the Executive Branch is chosen to maintain and sustain this 
effort. 
There are three primary options related to a “home” location for a domestic 
medical intelligence center.  They are the Department of Defense, within the Defense 
Intelligence Agency/Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center; the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services; and the Department of Homeland Security.  
If the center were to reside within the Department of Defense, it would be able to 
be absorbed by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.  While there would need 
to be supplemental personnel and funding associated with this initiative, a significant 
amount of the infrastructure and existing subject matter expertise already is in place.  
However, the use of the Department of Defense for intelligence operations within the 
United States brings with it a unique set of legal challenges.  Executive Order 12333, 
signed on 4 December 1981, describes the intelligence functions authorized for various 
federal agencies.  Section 1.11 describes the role for the Department of Defense with a 
strong and consistent focus on foreign or international activity.  The only discussion 
regarding operations within the United Stated occurs in subsection (d) which states, 
“conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components 
outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in 
coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of 
Defense and the Attorney General.” 
While DoD intelligence operations have been extremely limited within the United 
States, the ever expanding and evolving role of the United States Northern Command 
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(USNORTHCOM) plays a factor in potential future operational capabilities.  However, it 
appears that any significant expansion in domestic intelligence operations would require 
a revision to existing executive orders. 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services does not have the 
existing infrastructure to establish and maintain an intelligence function.  HHS recently 
developed an Office of Security and Strategic Information (OSSI) that is responsible for 
the establishment and maintenance of its information security program needs, such as the 
appropriate storage and management of classified documents and the development and 
management of secure communications equipment.  Developing a center within the 
Department of Health and Human Services would be as, if not more, costly than starting 
a stand-alone center.   In addition, the subject matter expertise for intelligence collection, 
analysis, and dissemination does not exist within the organization at this time.   
The third alternative is the United States Department of Homeland Security, 
which already has an existing intelligence function that is well established both 
physically and strategically.  This, combined with its current position in the emergency 
preparedness and response community, its state and local government outreach, 
governmental coordination, and existing infrastructure would make DHS a viable option.  
More specifically, the center should be located within the Office of Health Affairs.  This 
directorate already has a well established background in coordination with both the 
medical and intelligence communities.  In addition, it has many of the physical resources 
required to establish and maintain an intelligence operations in collaboration with other 
Departmental intelligence functions. Also, United States Department of Homeland 
Security Chief Intelligence Officer Charlie Allen has stated that it is his intention to have 
a DHS intelligence analyst in each state and local fusion center in the nation.  While this 
is an admirable desire, it would not address the medical intelligence issue unless it 
includes personnel with health experience and changes the existing mentality among 
most fusion centers that the role of medical intelligence is not a priority.  This connection 
will be vital in the collection and sharing of data with state and local governments.  
Aside from these three primary options, other alternatives include private or 
public universities or a federally-funded research and development center (FFRDC).  The 
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utilization of private or public universities may be a cause of concern to some state and 
local governments and could potentially affect participation in the program.  The 
utilization of a federally-funded research and development center also could be 
controversial.29  While medical intelligence does not contain patient-specific data, the 
perception of the general public may be that state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments are sharing private information with universities or private corporations.  
Of the options presented, the best of those currently available would be the 
Department of Homeland Security.  This option would require the fewest legislative 
changes and would be least costly to implement.  Costs incurred would be limited to 
personnel and their supporting office infrastructure.  This would allow the development 
of a single center, at the national level, to coordinate all domestic medical intelligence 
functions. 
2. Who are the Key Partners? 
One of the fundamental discussions surrounding whether medical intelligence is 
an intelligence function with a medical focus or a medical function with an intelligence 
focus concerns staffing.  This fundamental decision will guide a majority of the day-to-
day operations of a domestic medical intelligence center.  I propose that it is an 
intelligence function with a medical focus but not based on what currently is commonly 
referred to as intelligence.  On a state and local level, intelligence is all too frequently 
focused on terrorism and criminal activities.  This focus leaves the intelligence ball in a 
law enforcement court as opposed to providing a multi-agency approach.  In order for 
this type of a center to be effective, intelligence must be taken out of the criminal arena 
and included as part of a larger, more diverse program. 
Both within the intelligence community and the health care and public health 
community, many agencies need to be involved in order for a domestic medical 
intelligence center to be effective.  The first, and probably the most important, 
                                                 
29. Kevin Kosar, “The Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private 
Sector Legal Characteristics,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (CRS Order Code 
RL20533), 15. 
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relationship is with the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS).  The Department of Health and Human Services will serve as a key conduit for 
information sharing, both in and out of a domestic medical intelligence center.  In 
addition to providing a pathway to contact state, local, tribal, and territorial health 
officials, DHHS can assist in providing subject matter expertise for a wide variety of 
medical intelligence issues.  As the lead agency for emergency support function #8, 
DHHS, in turn, will receive valuable actionable intelligence in support of its mission.  In 
addition, DHHS’s operational assets will be able to plan, respond, and recover from 
various large-scale incidents with a greater sense of situational awareness and a common 
operating picture.  DHHS, through its many operational divisions, conducts significant 
research and analysis in a wide variety of medical-related fields.  Other federal agencies 
include, but are not limited to, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veteran’s 
Affairs, United States Secret Service, United States Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States 
Capitol Police, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
At state, local, tribal, and territorial levels are a number of agencies that would 
serve as key partners in ensuring the collection and dissemination of information.  These 
include, but are not limited to, departments responsible for such functions as public 
health, epidemiology, laboratory services, animal control, radiation protection, 
occupational health, environmental health, emergency management, law enforcement, 
poison control, water authority, veterinary services, and state emergency medical services  
In addition, jurisdictions should include any existing or developing intelligence fusion 
centers in their medical intelligence operations. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
1. Key Staffing 
In order for a domestic medical intelligence center to be effective, its key 
leadership must have access to decision makers at a wide variety of agencies.  As 
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identified by the Hurricane Katrina After Action Report, one of the major debates 
surrounding the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s preparedness and response 
capability in relation to Hurricane Katrina stemmed from the merger of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency into the Department of Homeland Security.30  Many 
believe this placed the agency too low in the hierarchy to be effective.  Similarly, we 
must ensure that the same does not happen with a domestic medical intelligence center.  
While it does not necessarily have to be a cabinet level agency, access to key senior 
officials in a timely manner is essential.  If one were to continue with the viable option of 
placing this center within the Department of Homeland Security, the position ideally 
would be located within the Department’s Office of Health Affairs.  Organizationally, 
there are a number of alternatives; however, the structure must be established in such a 
way as to limit the development of non-collaborative organizational units.  A proposed 
organizational structure can be found in Figure 7. 
 
                                                 
30. A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, DC: The House of Representatives, 
February 2006), 151. 
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Figure 7.   Proposed Domestic Medical Intelligence Center Organizational Chart. 
 
D. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. Department of Health and Human Services 
As one of the key partners in a domestic medical intelligence center, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) plays an integral role in the 
collection and dissemination of information.  In addition, it is in a position to provide 
subject matter expertise in a wide variety of medical specialties through its various 
operational divisions.   
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During the initial stages of development, DHHS can provide significant assistance 
by working toward establishing the preliminary data collection set, in addition to 
preparing potential data sources from which it already may receive data.  DHHS, by 
design, has a large number of operational divisions that span a wide variety of specialties, 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the National Institute of Health 
and the Food and Drug Administration.  Each of these operations divisions interact 
frequently with its counterparts on a state and local level.  These relationships would 
need to be identified and mapped out on a national level.  This would help prevent the 
domestic medical intelligence center from placing multiple requests for the same data to 
state and local governments.   
Once the center is operational, DHHS should assign at least one staff member, 
around the clock, to the domestic medical intelligence center to serve as a liaison to the 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary’s Operations Center and the various 
operational divisions within DHHS.  These individuals would be able to reach back to 
DHHS for specific information not readily available within the center itself.  In return, 
both the Secretary’s Operations Center and emergency operations centers within the 
various operational divisions within DHHS would benefit from an increased level of 
situation awareness and would be integrated into the common operating picture.  
DHHS, through its Office of Global Health Affairs, also would serve as a conduit, 
in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, for information-sharing with 
organizations such as the World Health Organization and other nations. 
2. Department of Defense 
The roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) will be based 
upon its current level of involvement with both general and medical intelligence matters.  
Entities such as the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) most likely 
would be the most involved DOD entity, followed by the various medical commands of 
the different branches, along with the United States Northern Command.   
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These entities would be responsible for sharing existing information regarding 
potential global threats that pose a risk to the United States, in addition to assisting with 
information collection and dissemination in the event of response operations within the 
United States, such as a response to a natural or man-made disaster.   
3. Other Federal Agencies 
Other federal agencies, such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would 
serve as partner agencies in the collection and dissemination of information to their 
respective state and local partners.  The key to a successful center would be the 
exploitation of existing data collection mechanisms.  Each of these agencies collect and 
report on information throughout the nation on a regular basis.  The input from these 
agencies in both the collection and dissemination of information is crucial.  Ideally, we 
would utilize these existing mechanisms instead of developing new ones. 
4. State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments 
State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments would play a key role in 
the implementation of such a center.  Without available data, the nationwide analysis is 
inaccurate and becomes increasingly useless.  In addition, these various levels of 
government are instrumental in developing the appropriate reporting mechanisms to 
support their respective missions.  The creation of reports that do not support the end user 
is useless.  SLTT governments know what information they need and who they need to 
share it with to support their preparedness and response activities.   
State, local, tribal, and territorial governments would be responsible for 
participating actively in the collection and reporting of information to their respective 
partners.  While state and local governments cannot be mandated to participate, financial 
support through existing funding sources such as Department of Homeland Security 
grants and Department of Health and Human Services public health and health care 
grants could be utilized to help facilitate participation.   
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E. DATA COLLECTION/INFORMATION SHARING 
There are a number of various data points that would need to be collected, 
collectively analyzed, and reported in order to be beneficial to federal, state, and local 
governments.  Much of the data listed below currently is being collected at the state level 
and in some cases at the federal level.  Table 2 provides a brief synopsis of the proposed 
data points, whether or not they currently are collected at the state and/or federal level, 
and whether or not they should be available before the center becomes operational 
(primary), during the initial years (secondary), and in outlying years (tertiary).  While the 
table addresses whether or not the data is currently collected, one of the major gaps is the 
integration of this data from the various sources and the integrated analysis.  While the 
collection may be taking place, the latter, in most cases, is not.  In addition, the table 
addresses whether the data is predominantly detection-based, response-based, or both.  
While an abnormal occurrence in any one of these data points alone may not be a cause 
for alarm, a combination may.  Currently, there is no method for a state or the federal 
government to assess abnormal occurrences collectively across all of these fields. 
 
Data Set Currently 
Collected 
Priority Detection/Response
Animal Control Yes Tertiary Detection 
Radiation Yes Primary Detection 
Nuclear Yes Primary Detection 
Disease Surveillance Yes Primary Detection 
Syndromic 
Surveillance 
Yes Primary Detection 
School Health 
Surveillance 
Yes Secondary Detection 




Yes Primary Detection/ Response 
Department of Defense 
Sensors 
Yes Primary Detection/ Response 
Private Sector Sensors Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response 
Veterinary/zoological  Yes Secondary Detection 
Agricultural data No Secondary Detection 
CDC Quarantine 
Station 
Yes Primary Detection 
Pre-hospital Care 
Diagnosis 
Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response 
Poison Control Yes Primary Detection 
Aeromedical 
Evacuation 
No Secondary Detection/ Response 
Water Testing Yes Secondary Detection 
Hospital Bed Status Yes Primary Response 
Hospital Critical Asset 
Survey 
Yes Tertiary Response 
Hospital Capabilities No Secondary Response 
BioSense Yes Primary Detection 
Nursing Home No Secondary Detection 
Air Sampling Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response 
Occupational Health Yes Tertiary Detection/ Response 
Background Illness 
Levels 
Yes Primary Detection 
Table 2.   Domestic Medical Intelligence Center Data. 
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1. Animal Control Data 
Animal control data provide a wide variety of beneficial information.  In the event 
of a biological event, animals, both domesticated and non-domesticated, may serve as 
key indicators of a potential natural or man-made biological or chemical attack.  In early 
January 2007, approximately 60 dead birds were found on the streets of Austin, Texas, 
around the Capitol.  The discovery of these birds initially had the public fearing the 
worst, including the release of hazardous chemicals or some type of biological pathogen. 
However, it was discovered subsequently that the deaths were due to natural causes.  
Cases similar to this one have occurred throughout the nation.  Data on the rates of 
animal illness in addition to suspicious death data may serve as indicators of potential 
domestic or international terrorist attacks.   
Animal control data are collected and analyzed by a variety of organizations, 
including state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, animal shelters, the American 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, veterinarians, and other sources.  
Information reported should be analyzed to prevent the potential for duplicate data. 
2. Radiation (Source Movement and Current Radiological Programs) 
The movement of radioactive sources over the roads, waterways, and railways of 
the United States occurs on a daily basis.  Also, radiation detectors are actively monitored 
on those same roadways, waterways, and railways.  In addition to tracking the movement 
of radioactive sources throughout the jurisdiction, effective monitoring of the theft or 
potential theft of radioactive material is critical.  An August 2003 report by the 
Government Accountability Office (then named the General Accounting Office) states 
that there have been more than 1,300 incidents of loss, theft, or abandonment of sealed 
radiological sources between 1998 and the time the report was published.31  While the 
report states that a majority of the devices subsequently were recovered, this remains a 
cause of concern.  The combination of acquisition of radiological sources through theft 
                                                 
31. Nuclear Security Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive 
Sources (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, August 2003), 4. 
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and the theft of explosives within the same jurisdiction or through a variety of sources 
may be an indicator of potential terrorist activity.   
In addition, the identification of programs, hospitals, health care treatment 
centers, academic centers, construction companies, and other entities that may be 
utilizing, storing, or shipping radiological material is critical.  In addition to 
identification, these entities should be involved in a collaborative manner to assist with 
the identification of stolen material or the potential black market trafficking of 
radioactive material.  
Radiological data are collected by a number of difference agencies.  Typically, at 
least one entity at the state level is responsible for the inspection of health care-based 
radiological programs.  This may reside within the state public health agency or another 
agency, such as environmental health.  In some jurisdictions, this information may be 
reported to the emergency management agency or the fire department.  
3. Nuclear (Source Movement and Pertinent Nuclear Programs) 
The movement of nuclear material throughout the United States is highly 
regulated and monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; however, many times 
such data are not shared with state and local governments.  The movement of nuclear 
material should be monitored and tracked for the same purposes mentioned above for 
radioactive material. 
In addition, the identification of programs, hospitals, health care treatment 
centers, academic centers, power plants, and other entities that may be utilizing, storing, 
or shipping nuclear material is critical.  In addition to identification, these entities should 
be involved in a collaborative manner to assist with the identification of stolen material or 
the potential black market trafficking of radioactive material.  
Nuclear data may be collected by the state public health agency, the state 
environmental health agency, or nuclear power plants within the jurisdiction.   
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4. Disease Surveillance Data 
States throughout the nation either have developed or utilize commercial off-the-
shelf disease surveillance systems.  These data subsequently are uploaded into the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
(NEDSS).  While disease surveillance data are helpful, there is a time delay between the 
time of reporting and the time of analysis.  In addition, the reporting is based upon the 
clinical provider reporting data in a timely and accurate manner.  The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention currently maintains a list of diseases that require mandatory 
reporting at the county, state, and federal levels.  These diseases include: 
• Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS)   
• Anthrax  
• Arboviral neuroinvasive and 
non-neuroinvasive diseases (such as 
Eastern and Western equine 
encephalitis) 
• Botulism  
• Brucellosis  
• Chancroid  
• Chlamydia trachomatis, genital 
infections  
• Cholera  
• Coccidioidomycosis   
• Cryptosporidiosis  
• Cyclosporiasis  
• Diphtheria  
• Ehrlichiosis  
• Giardiasis  
• Gonorrhea  
• Haemophilus influenzae, 
invasive disease  
• Hansen disease (leprosy)  
• Hantavirus pulmonary 
syndrome   
• Hemolytic uremic syndrome, 
post-diarrheal   
• Hepatitis, viral, acute   
• Hepatitis, viral, chronic  
• HIV infection  
• Influenza-associated pediatric 
mortality  
• Legionellosis  
• Listeriosis  
• Lyme disease  
• Malaria  
• Measles  
• Meningococcal disease  
• Mumps  
• Novel influenza A virus 
infections  
• Pertussis  
• Plague  
• Poliomyelitis, paralytic  
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• Poliovirus infection, 
nonparalytic  
• Psittacosis  
• Q Fever   
• Rabies   
• Rocky Mountain spotted fever  
• Rubella  
• Rubella, congenital syndrome  
• Salmonellosis  
• Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome-associated Coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV)  
• Shiga toxin-producing 
Escherichia coli (STEC)  
• Shigellosis  
• Smallpox  
• Streptococcal disease, invasive, 
Group A  
• Streptococcal toxic-shock 
syndrome   
• Streptococcus pneumoniae, 
drug resistant, invasive disease   
• Streptococcus pneumoniae, 
invasive in children <5 years  
• Syphilis   
• Syphilis, congenital  
• Tetanus  
• Toxic-shock syndrome (other 
than Streptococcal)  
• Trichinellosis (Trichinosis)  
• Tuberculosis  
• Tularemia  
• Typhoid fever  
• Vancomycin - intermediate 
Staphylococcus aureus (VISA)  
• Vancomycin - resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA)  
• Varicella (morbidity)  
• Varicella (deaths only)  
• Vibriosis  
• Yellow fever 
 
Disease surveillance data are collected from a wide variety of entities, including 
state and local public health departments, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and other health 
care entities.  These data already are analyzed on local, state, and federal levels.  The 
sharing of these data with a domestic medical intelligence center should be rather simple. 
5. Syndromic Surveillance Data 
Syndromic surveillance as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention is “surveillance using health-related data that precede diagnosis and signal a 
sufficient probability of a case or an outbreak to warrant further public health 
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response.”32  The system is predicated on the assumption that some disease outbreaks or 
acts of terrorism can be detected based on the symptoms that patients exhibit, as opposed 
to a formal diagnosis.  The utilization of this method of surveillance allows information 
to be collected earlier in the diagnosis and treatment stages.  In addition, it allows more 
rapid identification of potential hazards.  While one often is unable to identify the 
specific pathogen or agent involved, it may be possible to rule out some and rule in 
others.  This ability is key to determining whether the information at hand in an indicator 
or warning of a potential terrorist event.  Typically, during day-to-day operations, these 
data are collected manually or electronically throughout the nation and analyzed by 
epidemiologists in the public, private, and military sectors.  While these systems collect 
data from a wide variety of sources, including hospitals, poison control centers, primary 
care clinics, physician’s offices, schools, and pharmacies, the data still require routine 
analysis and examination.  Unfortunately, most data are collected and analyzed on a state 
level and in limited areas on a regional level; however, there currently is no national level 
analysis of syndromic surveillance data with the exception of the BioSense program.   
While syndromic surveillance data are a key component to the medical 
intelligence function, one must not omit the other available sources of information. 
Syndromic surveillance data, similar to disease surveillance data, are collected 
from a wide variety of entities, including state and local public health departments, 
hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, schools, and other health care sources.  These data already 
are analyzed on local, state, and federal levels.  The sharing of these data with a domestic 
medical intelligence center should be rather simple. 
6. School Health Surveillance Data 
Disease and syndromic surveillance data typically are collected from a wide 
variety of sources, including pharmacies, hospitals, physician’s offices, and primary care 
clinics; however, emerging data sources include public, private, and charter schools.  
Children serve as reservoirs for a variety of diseases and many times are responsible for 
                                                 
32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Syndromic Surveillance: An Applied Approach to 
Outbreak Detection,” http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/syndromic.htm (Accessed July 3, 2007). 
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transmitting diseases to either other children or parents and family at home.  Recent 
technological advances allow for schools to report data either via web-based interfaces or 
touch-tone telephones.  This allows schools and facilities that may not have Internet 
access readily accessible within their nurse’s offices to submit data.  Ideally, collection 
should be enhanced to include day care centers, pre-schools, and kindergarten programs.  
With the recent technological advances, even home-based day care centers could 
participate in data submission. 
7. BioWatch Data 
The BioWatch program, coordinated by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, is a system of nationwide biological agent sensors.  The program is 
operated by a number of partner agencies, including the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and local and state public health 
laboratories.  
The Environmental Protection Agency’s role includes the maintenance of the 
sensors that collect the airborne particles.  After these airborne particles are collected, in 
most cases they are sent to state and local public health laboratories for testing.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assists with the coordination; however, the 
actual testing is conducted by local and state labs, which are members of the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s Laboratory Response Network.   
The BioWatch Program, funded and overseen by DHS, has three main elements 
each coordinated by different agencies: sampling, analysis, and response. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the sampling component, the sensors 
that collect airborne particles. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of the samples, though testing actually is 
carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Local jurisdictions are responsible 
for the public health response to positive findings. 
Jurisdictions that contain BioWatch sensors already have established alerting and 
response protocols to follow in the event of a BioWatch actionable result.  The protocols 
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include both a state and local conference call and a national conference call.  It would be 
ideal for the domestic medical intelligence center to participate on the national 
conference call. 
8. Federal Government Sensor Data 
Federal agencies throughout the nation maintain the capability to monitor and 
detect various chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive agents.  Within the 
National Capital Region, sensors are maintained by a wide variety of agencies, including 
the United States Capitol Police, the United States Secret Service, and the Department of 
Homeland Security.  While data are routinely collected and analyzed within each agency, 
there is no known central coordinating point for all of the data in its entirety.   
Major metropolitan regions that maintain a large federal presence would benefit 
significantly from having consolidated reporting from all of the federal agencies 
involved.  Unfortunately, most agencies, federal, state, and local, don’t even know what 
sensors are currently out there, who owns them, and who receives notifications from 
these sensors when they are triggered.   
A central database would need to be established with current sensors for all 
federal agencies.  Data would include location, host agency, sensor type, reporting 
frequency, collection/sampling methodology, reporting entity, and other basic 
information. 
9. Department of Defense Sensor Data 
The Department of Defense maintains sensors that are able to detect a wide 
variety of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive material throughout 
the nation at a number of facilities throughout the nation.  The Department of Defense 
Installation Protection Program, commonly referred to as Guardian, currently is managed 
by the United States Army.  It has approximately 200 DOD-owned or leased facilities 
scheduled to participate by FY11.  Guardian systems include a wide variety of programs, 
including detection, identification, warning, protection, decontamination, information 
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management, medical protection, surveillance and response.33  While a significant 
amount of data are collected, there is little awareness on a state level of potential alarms 
or abnormal results.  
10. Private Sector Sensor Data 
While we have discussed sensor data collected by federal agencies and the 
Department of Defense, there are a large number of private commercial entities that 
maintain sensors throughout major metropolitan areas.  Major corporations may lose 
significant amounts of money in the event of a natural, man-made, or technological 
disaster.  While some rely on local first responders, others, such as private firms on Wall 
Street in New York City,34 have taken matters into their own hands.  Some even have 
gone so far as to develop intricate wireless sensor systems for radiation, toxic industrial 
chemical, and chemical warfare agents.35  In addition, it is not uncommon to see larger 
companies maintain decontamination systems, shelter in-place supplies, and other 
systems in preparation for a wide variety of incidents.36  The funds spent on these 
systems are negligible compared to the potential financial losses at stake.  Unfortunately, 
in some cases, the local first responders are not even aware that they exist.  While the 
federal government cannot force the private sector to share data, collaboration through 
entities such as the Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils 
established for critical infrastructure can lead to a mutually beneficial relationship for 
medical intelligence.   
Private sector data would ideally be collected through the city and/or state in 
which they reside.  This would ensure that state and local governments are not excluded 
from any individual reporting streams.  In the event that larger, multi-jurisdictional 
agencies wish to submit data on a regional or national level, the domestic medical 
intelligence center should share the data with the respective state and local governments. 
                                                 
33. A-GRAM Installation Protection Program – Guardian (Tyndall AFB, Florida, June, 2005), 1. 
34. New York Business Executive, interview by author, New York, New York, Spring 2005. Interview 




11. Veterinary/Zoological Data  
One significantly underutilized resource is the numerous partners who can assist 
us in collecting veterinary or zoological data.  In addition to our nation’s zoos, additional 
information regarding existing or emerging threats from the animal population may be 
identified by park rangers, animal control personnel, private sector kennels, veterinary 
schools, and wildlife associations.  The use of a chemical or biological agent may result 
in the development of illnesses or deaths in our animal population prior to any signs and 
symptoms appearing among humans.  Close collaboration with animal control personnel 
on a state and local level is crucial.  In addition, accessibility to the expertise provided by 
zoo staffs from across the nation also would be beneficial.  When facing a potential 
biological threat, some of the diseases may originate or affect animals.   
12. Agricultural Data 
Data from various agricultural resources on the local, state, and federal levels can 
help identify potential outbreaks of diseases that may not directly affect the human 
population.  In addition to information from farms and ranches, information should be 
collected from the various processing and distribution facilities throughout the nation.  
Due to the significant amount of importation of food from around the globe, close 
coordination with public health organizations in other nations is vital.  While humans 
may not be directly at risk, the global economic impacts from issues such as foot and 
mouth disease and avian influenza could be significant. 
13. CDC Quarantine Station Data 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, through its Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine, staffs 20 quarantine stations that are responsible for public 
health-related matters at seaports and airports throughout the nation, and some in Canada 
and the Caribbean.  In addition to working routinely with agencies such as the Customs 
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Food and Drug 
Administration, the United States Coast Guard, and a wide variety of federal, state, and 
local partners, they are routinely evaluating whether ill individuals can enter the United 
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States and how to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.  Teams made up of 
medical officers and public health officials are the first line of defense at our nation’s 
various points of entry.  In addition, they respond to requests for medical attention aboard 
aircraft or maritime vessels, inspect animals, animal products, and human remains prior 
to entry, screen cargo and carry-on baggage for potential vectors that could carry 
communicable diseases, and provide travelers with health information.  
14. Pre-hospital Care Diagnosis Data 
Traditional syndromic and disease surveillance systems are based predominantly 
based in hospital, clinic, and other non-pre-hospital care sources.  The collection of pre-
hospital syndromic surveillance data is not a new phenomenon.  Data collection has been 
conducted as far back as 1998 by jurisdictions such as New York City.   New York City 
has been collecting ambulance dispatch data since as early as 1998. 37  While dispatch 
information may not always be accurate, in lieu of actual patient care data, dispatch data 
are a useful starting point.  As the use of electronic patient care reporting expands 
throughout the nation, the integration of this data becomes easier.   
Pre-hospital data should be collected through the various state and local 
governments and not directly from each agency. 
15. Poison Control Data 
According to the American Association of Poison Control Centers, the number of 
human exposure case records opened in 2004 (the latest data set available) has increased 
3.7 percent since 2002 to 2,473,750, and the number of animal exposure case records in 
2004 increased 8.5 percent to 141,205.38  In addition, the average population size served 
by each poison control center also increased by almost 300,000.  From a medical 
intelligence perspective, as more people are utilizing these centers, the potential exists 
                                                 
37. Nancy Greenko, “Clinical Evaluation of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Ambulance 
Dispatched-Based Syndromic Surveillance System, New York City,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of 
the New York Academy of Medicine 80, no. 2 supplement 1 (2003): i50. 
38. American Association of Poison Control Centers, “2004 Poison Center Survey,” 
http://www.aapcc.org/2004_poison_center_survey_results.htm (Accessed June 12, 2007). 
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that they may hold some of the vital clues related to the identification of a natural or man-
made incident involving radiological, biological, or chemical agents.  While some poison 
control centers are involved in local syndromic surveillance systems, many are not.  The 
American Association of Poison Control Centers does maintain the National Poisoning 
and Exposure Database, but these currently are not integrated into existing public health 
systems, an issue that could be resolved by the development of a medical intelligence 
center. 
16. Aeromedical Evacuation Data 
Similar to pre-hospital care diagnosis data, information collected by aeromedical 
personnel may be useful to state and federal officials.  Aeromedical services are in the 
unique position to deal with patients from a pre-hospital arena and during the 
transportation of patients between facilities.  At times, due to the large geographic area 
served by most aeromedical services, syndromic surveillance data may not be integrated 
into existing systems.  Some programs even are dispatched by personnel several states 
away.  During large-scale events that span large geographic areas, aeromedical 
evacuation operations face challenges not seen in routine operations.  In some cases, 
collaboration with law enforcement or other partner agencies may be necessary.  
Collaboration through a medical intelligence center may be helpful.  
Aeromedical evacuation data should be collected through the various state and 
local governments, similar to pre-hospital care data. 
17. Water Testing Data 
Water testing throughout the nation is conducted by a wide variety of 
organizations.  In areas of the nation that predominantly utilize well-based systems, water 
may go years or decades without being tested.  In these cases, the contamination of water 
supply systems by intentional or unintentional means may go unnoticed for a number of 
years.  While it would be impractical to expect all land owners with well-based systems 
to test their water on a regular basis, jurisdictions that currently conduct water testing 
need to integrate their results with local and state public health reporting systems.  
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Jurisdictions with private sector water testing entities should develop a collaborative 
mechanism in which the appropriate data can be shared. 
In addition to private water testing data, municipal water systems undergo 
rigorous testing for a wide range of contaminants.  Hopefully, any attempts to 
intentionally contaminate public water supplies would be identified through this testing.  
Testing information that may not appear to be terrorism-related but may be abnormal 
may go unnoticed if not integrated with other medical intelligence data.   
The third, and one of the more vulnerable systems, is our bottled water industry.  
With the use of bottled water on the rise, the potential for contamination always is 
present.  In addition, the amount of contaminant required to contaminate a bottle of water 
is significantly less than that needed to contaminate a well, reservoir, or public water 
supply. 
A thorough analysis of these systems, along with others, can be facilitated through 
a medical intelligence center. 
Water testing data can be collected from state and local governments, the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, and private laboratories.  Private laboratory data should 
be fed through their respective state and local governments.  
18. Hospital Bed Status Data 
The evaluation of hospital bed status has become the benchmark for assessing 
medical surge capacity.  However, this is one benchmark that is changing consistently.  
The lack of a real-time bed status system forces states to rely on hospitals to self-report.  
Unfortunately, a hospital’s bed status can change minute by minute while reporting  
typically is conducted only once every one to six hours.  There are a number of factors 
that go into determining hospitals’ current bed availability, the least of which are 
equipment related.  Hospitals throughout the nation have empty beds available; however, 
they do not have the personnel to staff them.  On an average day, emergency rooms 
around the nation are operating at or above capacity.  They frequently hold patients who  
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are waiting to be admitted to beds throughout the facility.  The assessment of bed 
availability one minute does not account for the rapid influx of patients from a non-
related event five minutes later.   
Another significant challenge in collecting and assessing bed data from multiple 
regions or states is a lack of consistency in terminology.  For instance, when assessing 
neonatal bed capacity, are we referring to a level 1, 2, 3, or a regional neonatal intensive 
care unit?  If we are assessing the current capacity for burn patients, do we survey 
facilities that have American Burn Association credentialed burn beds or those that are 
self-designated.  The after action report from the Rhode Island Night Club Fire in 2003 
discusses the need to further evaluate the transfer of all moderate and critically burned 
patients to American Burn Association accredited burn centers, as opposed to being held 
closer to home at local hospitals.39  Even within the same state, terms may not be 
consistent hospital to hospital.  For example, what is the true definition of a surgical 
intensive care unit?  One hospital may have one while another may not; however, both 
may be fully capable of caring for a patient in a post-operative state.   
The only true fix for this issue would be to develop a standardized set of 
definitions for hospital bed types throughout the nation.  The Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Incident Management System Integration Center has taken on the 
daunting task of resource-typing assets in a wide variety of categories throughout the 
nation; however, the typing of hospital assets has not been completed yet.  The only 
medical assets to be resource-typed to date are National Disaster Medical System 
response teams.  Nothing prevents similar resource typing from being conducted for 
hospitals beds, medical equipment, and clinical and non-clinical hospital personnel.  In 
the interim, the best stopgap measure would be to utilize the bed categories as defined by 
the National Disaster Medical System, with the addition of more descript definitions of 
what each of the categories contains. 
                                                 
39. Rhode Island The Station Club Fire After-Action Report (Washington, DC, Department of 
Homeland Security, September 2004), E-45. 
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Hospital bed status data should be collected through the various state health 
departments.  In addition, data submitted through the National Disaster Medical System 
can be utilized. 
19. Hospital Critical Asset Survey 
Unfortunately, the days of hospitals maintaining a weeks’ worth of equipment and 
supplies are long gone.  In today’s world of just-in-time inventories, many hospitals 
maintain only enough supplies for one or two days.  Some even depend on multiple 
deliveries in the same day to maintain an adequate par level.  This makes the ability to 
assess current asset capabilities even more critical today than in years past.   
Hospitals throughout the nation have conducted critical asset surveys of both staff 
and equipment over the last few years.  Health departments on local and state levels have 
attempted to collect and analyze the data for potential shortfalls and surpluses that could 
affect the ability for that region to respond to and manage a large-scale event.  One issue 
however, is the lack of consistency of that data across the nation.  Some only conduct 
inventories of equipment assets, such as ventilators, rapid infusers, and intravenous 
pumps, while others include pharmaceuticals and still others include personnel.  While 
this may assist in assessing the capabilities for that specific area, it makes a multi-state or 
national analysis extremely difficult.  In addition, many state and local health 
departments have not been successful in collecting this information from a majority of 
their regions. 
In addition, we must ensure that the completion of these surveys is not unduly 
burdensome to the facilities themselves.  In the future, the development of an electronic 
system that is tied into the facilities inventory management system would be ideal.  This 
would allow real-time assessments of current inventory levels without the requirement 
for facilities to enter data into some type of reporting system.  At the same time, a 
common set of data points must be developed to allow for adequate consistency 
throughout the nation.  While this concept is not going to be available in the near future, 
it can become possible as more and more health care facilities become more 
technologically integrated.   
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Ideally, these data would be collected from the various state health departments 
throughout the nation. 
20. Hospital Capabilities 
In addition to bed availability and critical asset surveys, there currently is no 
single repository of hospital capabilities in the nation.  While independent organizations 
such as the American College of Surgeons maintain lists of organizations that have 
chosen to meet its standards and guidelines for designation as trauma centers, there is no 
single, overall data repository of the wide variety of other specialties.  Making this more 
difficult is the lack of consistent definition as to what constitutes the various levels or 
capabilities throughout the wide spectrum of medicine.  As we have seen at a number of 
man-made and natural disasters over the last decade, the need to share medical resources 
and personnel is critical.  Appropriate allocation and assessments of needs can be 
successful only if all of the appropriate information is available.  Currently, teams with 
the National Disaster Medical System deploy throughout the nation to a wide variety of 
disasters; however, once they arrive, there is little to no information available as to the 
capabilities of hospitals throughout their area of operations.  The development of a 
national dataset of hospital capabilities, along with a standardized set of definitions and a 
method of maintenance, is essential.  
Hospital capabilities to assess include, but are not limited to: 
Medical Services 
• Allergy and immunology  
• Cardiology  
• Dentistry  
• Dermatology  




• Emergency medicine  
o 24-hour full-time 
physicians 
o 24-hour on-call 
physicians 
o 24-hour full-time 
nurses 
• Endocrinology  
• Epidemiology  
• Gastroenterology  
• General medicine/family 
practice  
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• Hematology  
• Infectious disease  
• Internal medicine  
• Nephrology  





• Occupational medicine 
• Oncology 
• Pediatrics 
• Physical medicine and 
rehabilitation 
• Preventive medicine 
• Psychiatry 
• Pulmonology 
• Public health Surgical 
Services 
• Anesthesiology 
• Cardiovascular surgery 
• Ear, nose, and throat 
(ENT) 
• General surgery 





• Orthopedic surgery 
• Pediatric surgery 




• Stomatology (oral 
surgery) 
• Thoracic surgery 
• Trauma surgery 
• Urology 
Ancillary Services 
• Blood banks 
• Intensive care units 
o Burn unit 
o Cardiac care unit 
o Cardiac surgery 
unit 
o Neonatal unit 
o Neurology unit 
o Pediatric unit 
o Surgical unit 
o Trauma unit 











• Physical therapy 














• Ownership (public, 
private, or military) 
• Language capabilities 
• Helipad capabilities 
o Landing zone size 
o Landing zone type 
o Fuel availability 
o Radio 
communications 
• Backup power supply 
o Type 
o Size 
o Fuel on hand 
• Medical gas storage 
o Type 
o Quantity 
• Loading dock capabilities 
 
 
While this is a significant amount of data, it can be collected and organized over a 
period of time.  Of prime importance are the data related to emergency medical care, such 
as emergency department capabilities, blood band services, helipad capabilities, and 
surgical and intensive care capabilities.  This can be followed by the remaining in-patient 
data and additional ancillary services.   
One of the key challenges will consist of the definition of each of the data fields 
and the validation of the data submitted.  Much of the data already should be available 
from state and local health departments.  Other data, specifically trauma and burn data, 
can be collected from various professional associations.  More difficult and detailed 
information will have to be collected via various surveys and subsequently validated by 





21. BioSense Data 
As reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the BioSense 
program is a “national program intended to improve the nation’s capabilities for 
conducting near real-time biosurveillance, enabling health situational awareness through 
access to existing data from health care organizations across the country. The primary 
objective is to expedite event recognition and response coordination among federal, state, 
and local public health and health care organizations by providing each level of public 
health access to the same data, at the same time.”40 
There currently is a significant amount of controversy surrounding this system, as 
it allows for data within a jurisdiction to be reported directly to the federal government, 
prior to analysis or assessment by the local or state public health department.  Despite 
this, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is working diligently to recruit new 
facilities to serve as partners in this nationwide initiative.  The program allows hospitals, 
clinics, commercial laboratories, poison control centers, and other health care partners to 
submit data electronically into the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
electronic surveillance system.   
However, this system has met a significant amount of resistance from both state 
and local health departments as it circumvents existing systems and excludes agencies 
currently partnered with health departments in their state and local initiatives.  
BioSense data provides one aspect of disease and syndromic surveillance.  It 
should not, and cannot, be utilized as the sole source of epidemiological information.  It 
should be utilized with local and state data in addition to other existing systems, such as 
the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based 
Epidemics (ESSENCE), utilized by the Department of Defense and several states 
throughout the nation.  The key to a successful epidemiological system is integration with 
state and local government partners. 
                                                 
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “BioSense,” http://www.cdc.gov/biosense/ (Accessed 
June 17, 2007). 
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22. Nursing Home Incident Data 
Despite the continuous outreach and expansion of syndromic and disease 
surveillance systems, one population that is a relative newcomer is nursing and long-term 
care facilities.  Facilities in this category include a wide variety of institutions from 
assisted living communities to centers for patients who are mobility impaired or 
ventilator dependent.  As the population of nursing and long-term care centers throughout 
the nation continues to increase, the inclusion of these centers in syndromic and disease 
surveillance systems is essential.  In addition, patients who are more susceptible to 
various illnesses may serve as initial indicators of a newly emerging man-made or 
naturally occurring biological threat. 
Nursing home data should be collected through the state level agency responsible 
for the licensing of those facilities. 
23. Air Sampling Data 
Air samples are collected by a wide variety of agencies throughout the nation for 
various purposes, including, but not limited to, sensing for chemical, biological, and 
radiological material, sampling for pollutants, and hazardous compounds.  Analysis of 
this data in a silo may allow some abnormal readings to be dismissed as opposed to being 
analyzed as part of the bigger picture. 
Air sample data can be collected by a wide variety of agencies including, but not 
limited to, state environmental health agencies, federal partners such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and private industry partners.   
24. Occupational Health Data 
Occupational health personnel are in the unique position of assisting prior to and 
after an incident.  Prior to an incident, occupational health professionals may assist with 
disease and syndromic surveillance; however, the inclusion of occupational health 
professionals in syndromic and disease surveillance systems and preparedness initiatives 
has been less than optimal in prior years.  In addition, they may assist with fit testing of 
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personal protective equipment, medical pre-screening for prophylaxis or treatment of 
various biological agents, and other activities.  In the event of an exposure to a chemical, 
biological, or radiological agent, both in and out of the workplace, occupational health 
professionals may be the first to interact with the patients or may assist with the 
dispensing of pharmacological interventions.   
Occupational health data can be collected by local and state health departments, 
state labor or employment agencies, and federal partners such as the Department of Labor 
and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration.  In addition, larger occupational 
health organizations such as Federal Occupational Health and occupational health 
professional associations also may be helpful sources. 
25. Background Illness Levels 
The only way to effectively determine whether or not there has been a potential 
chemical, biological, or radiological incident is to determine current background levels.  
Whether we are discussing radiation levels or syndromic surveillance, we must have a 
thorough understanding of our baseline.  Key partners in determining these baselines are 
emergency medical service agencies throughout the nation.  Historically, since a 
significant majority of emergency medical services agencies are either commercial or 
volunteer-based, they have not participated actively in syndromic surveillance or patient 
presentation reporting systems; however, their assessment of both call volume and type is 
vital to an appropriate and thorough assessment. 
26. Classified Data Sources 
State governments, more so than local, territorial, and tribal nations, will need to 
develop the ability to share classified data.  While this ability will need to expand and 
evolve over time, this should not prohibit a jurisdiction from sending or receiving data to 
or from a domestic medical intelligence center.  The quantity of classified reports within 
this sector should be minimal.  With the exception of some research and development 
information, medical countermeasures capabilities, federal/international operations, and 
threat assessments or reports, a majority of the documentation should be available at “for 
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official use only” or other sensitive but unclassified levels.  This will involve a significant 
shift from our current operations.  Traditionally, security clearances within state 
governments are held within law enforcement agencies, homeland security agencies, and 
key elected officials.  Over the past few years, state public health officials in some 
jurisdictions also have been able to obtain security clearances; however, the methods of 
obtaining those clearances vary state by state.  State governments will have to expand 
their current capabilities to access, store, disseminate, and communicate classified 
information by expanding current information security and communications security 
operations.  Key agency personnel in departments that may not have been involved in 
these types of operations will need to obtain security clearances.  Policies and procedures 
must be put into place regarding the management and handling of classified information 
within and among state level agencies.  Local, territorial, and tribal nations, based on 
size, geographic location, and need, also may have to take similar steps. 
From a federal perspective, barriers that traditionally have withheld classified 
information from state governments must be broken down.  Unfortunately, in the past, 
information has been withheld for one of two primary reasons, fear of information being 
disseminated to unapproved personnel, including the media, and the need to protect 
intelligence sources and methods of collection.  Anecdotally, most references in 
newspapers in regard to unnamed sources for sensitive information are traditionally at the 
federal level, not among state and local government.  In regard to the second issue, with 
very little exception, the vast majority of state, local, territorial, and tribal nations do not 
require access to sources and methods.  They are irrelevant to their operations.  
Essentially, we have sacrificed the sharing of all information for the protection of 
information that does not need to be shared.    
Precedent already has been set for this type of information-sharing outside of law 
enforcement.  Within the critical infrastructure program, lead federal agencies for the 
seventeen critical infrastructure sectors, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland 
Security, not only have begun sharing classified information with state and local 
governments, but also with the private sector.  In order to accomplish this, they have  
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worked with their partners to obtain security clearances for key personnel and advised 
their partners on the necessary measures that must be taken prior to sharing such 
information.   
F. REPORT DISSEMINATION 
Reporting typically falls into two categories, standard interval reporting and 
incident based reporting.  The reporting can be provided by a wide variety of methods, 
including direct briefings, written reports, or web-based reporting.  Typically, reports will 
be provided via multiple mediums to ensure the widest possible dissemination.  We must 
ensure that all appropriate parties have the ability to receive and safely store the 
information as required, based on the level of data classification. 
Reporting always must be accomplished with the end user in mind.  Reports that 
are unorganized or do not meet the needs of the customer are a significant waste of 
limited resources.  As is the case throughout the intelligence community, we must ensure 
that any reports generated are not subject to politicization and include careful analysis 
and not just clips from other reports.  In addition, reports must contain actionable 
intelligence.  It is not useful to provide raw, unanalyzed data to state and local 
governments that do not have the staff or expertise to extrapolate relevant information. 
In the case of a domestic medical intelligence center, I propose that a few 
mediums be utilized to deliver information effectively to the end user, including the 
establishment of a secure, unclassified web site similar to the one currently utilized by the 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center.  In addition, classified web sites on the secret 
Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS) could be added as the need arises in the future.  Also, 
as regular assessments and reports are received, they should be disseminated to state, 
local, tribal, and territorial health departments throughout the nation.  This may be 
facilitated by partnering with professional associations such as the Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officials and the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials. 
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1. Standard Interval Reporting 
These reports, similar to daily intelligence updates or law enforcement watch 
reports, would be provided on a daily basis and would include classified and unclassified 
information from both international and domestic sources.  Any significant closures, 
incidents, or changes from standard operations would be reported.  Over the past few 
years, there have been reports of individuals pretending to be inspectors and other 
suspicious activity surrounding hospitals and health care facilities; however, that 
information appears to reach more law enforcement then health care agencies.  This type 
of reporting would allow information to reach health care partners on federal, state, and 
local levels. 
A key component of the report dissemination is to ensure inclusion of both private 
sector and public sector partners.  Relationships established by the Government 
Coordinating Council and the Sector Coordinating Council will be instrumental in 
ensuring that reports reach all of the appropriate entities.  State and local governments 
with the appropriate security clearances, information security programs, and 
communications security equipment and procedures also should receive all appropriate 
reports in a timely manner. 
2. Incident Based Reporting 
Incident based reporting would be similar to standard interval reporting; however, 
the information presented would be geared toward the incident at hand.  The data 
collected and reporting methods would be different and dictated by the incident at hand.  
In addition, incident-based reporting would include tailored research based upon the 
information available at the time of the report.  In the event of an international incident, 
coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Division of Global 
Migration and Quarantine, the Department of Health and Human Service Office of 
Global Health Affairs, the Department of State, and foreign governments is critical.  
Relationships with non-traditional partners can be facilitated by the operational divisions 
within the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland 
Security that routinely deal with international issues. 
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G. SUMMARY 
The development of a single, nationwide domestic medical intelligence center 
will not be without its challenges.  However, continuing with the existing model of non-
standardized, non-integrated, non-inclusive domestic medical intelligence is not a 
reasonable option.   
As previously discussed, of the current potential locations for such a center, the 
best available option is the United States Department of Homeland Security.  While the 
center would be housed with the Department of Homeland Security, it must have an 
extremely close working relationship with a number of agencies both horizontally and 
vertically.  The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)will have 
to be intimately involved in many aspects of the operation.  In addition, HHS will be able 
to provide the subject matter expertise across the health care and public health sector to 
address any technical issues.  Other federal partners, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the United States Department of 
Defense, will have to establish additional relationships with state, local, tribal, and 
territorial partners throughout the nation, in addition to international partners such as the 
World Health Organization.  The support of professional organizations, such as the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Association of County 
and City Health Officials, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and the 
American Public Health Association also can assist in garnering support both vertically 
and horizontally.  All of these entities will be crucial in both the collection and 
dissemination of information to all appropriate organizations throughout the nation and 
internationally. 
Even prior to the development of the operational relationships, assessments must 
be completed to ensure that all appropriate parties are approached before the formal 
proposal.  In addition, one additional critical partner that could decide the fate of such a 
center is the Congress.  While the President has the authority to create agencies on his 
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own, such as the National Security Agency and the Peace Corps,41 as do his political 
appointees as seen with Defense Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms,42 the ideal method would be to follow the traditional route 
through the Congress, as these agencies tend to have stronger financial support and have 
almost as much access to the President as those created by the President himself.43  In 
addition to Congressional support, support from each of the respective Secretaries of the 
Cabinet level agencies and Directors of the independent agencies is crucial.  Many of 
these relationships already exist; others need to be fostered, and others need to be 
developed. 
Once the relationships have been determined and established, there must be an 
analysis and determination of a common data set.  These data, as described earlier, should 
be divided into three categories: data that would be needed prior to opening a domestic 
medical intelligence center; data that should be collected within the first couple of years; 
and data that should be added once the center has an established track record.  Typically, 
clinical data that are readily available and already reported on a state and federal level 
would come first.  This would be followed by data that are currently collected but not 
routinely shared, and lastly data that are not currently collected or shared.  While some of 
the data may not be integrated into the system for a number of years, much of the data 
require the design and establishment of systems that would have to begin sooner rather 
than later.  The key goal is to provide integrated, analyzed, synthesized, actionable 
intelligence to the end user. 
The framework presented here is only the beginning of a long and complicated, 
but not complex, series of steps that would need to be followed to establish a domestic 
medical intelligence center.  In addition, a thorough analysis of potential costs associated  
 
 
                                                 
41. William Howell and David Lewis, “Agencies by Presidential Design,” The Journal of Politics 64, 
no. 4 (November 2002): 1097. 
42. Ibid., 1097. 
43. Ibid., 1098. 
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with the development and operations of the center would need to be completed, along 
with any budget impacts on both the host agency and its numerous federal, state, local, 
















While the intelligence community has evolved over the last century, the field of 
medical intelligence is relatively new, and domestic medical intelligence is essentially an 
infant.  The Department of Defense currently has a well established medical intelligence 
operation, through the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Armed Forces Medical Intelligence 
Center, but no such center exists for domestic medical intelligence.  In addition, existing 
fusion centers do not analyze the entire spectrum of medical intelligence, but only a small 
component of the existing available data.  
During an Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting on March 22, 1949, Colonel 
Charles Blakeney of the Central Intelligence Agency defined medical intelligence as “the 
distribution and character of disease as they may influence planned operations, domestic 
affairs, or the national security, but also the climatologic, psychological, and physiologic 
intelligence as it bears upon the interrelationships between man, his environment, 
equipment and tasks.”44  Despite the focus on medical intelligence operations on nations 
outside the United States, this definition easily could be adapted for utilization within the 
United States.  As mentioned earlier, I propose that we define domestic medical 
intelligence as that category of intelligence resulting from the collection, integration, 
analysis, and dissemination of natural and man-made psychological, chemical, biological, 
radiological, environmental, and agricultural information with a public health and health 
care focus that may influence the day-to-day activities or national security of the nation 
or national assets.   
The system as it exists now leaves a significant void that affects not only the 
federal government, but state and local responders as well (see Figure 8).  The analysis of 
medical intelligence alone leads to a high level of situational awareness of topics such as 
disease, syndromic, environmental, and zoonotic surveillance, and a low level of 
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awareness of general CBRNE and hazmat issues and threat assessments.  The analysis of 
traditional law enforcement and fire department intelligence alone leads to the converse; 
however, integrated analysis leads to a much better overall awareness of a wide variety of 
potential hazards.  The development of a domestic medical intelligence center would help 
fill that void. 
As we have seen, there is little to no formal academic research into the field of 
domestic medical intelligence.  This, combined with the lack of a formal federal driving 
force, is leading to jurisdictions developing medical intelligence systems based on their 
own definitions of what medical intelligence should comprise.  As we have seen in the 
examples provided, the federal government, Department of Defense, and two local fusion 
centers seem to cover the spectrum in regard to the breadth of data collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of medical intelligence.  A majority of the fusion centers, with the 
Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center being one of a few exceptions, focus a vast 
majority of their efforts solely or primarily on syndromic or disease surveillance.  While 
this is an important component of domestic medical intelligence, it should not be the sole 
source.  A nationwide standard must be established in order to maintain an organized, 
rapid, and efficient response to naturally occurring or man-made health care and public 
health risks.    
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Figure 8.   Domestic Medical Intelligence Center Strategy Canvas. 
 
The need to fill this void will only increase in the years to come as the potential 
threat from a man-made, or naturally occurring biological agents, continues to resurface.  
The creation of a domestic medical intelligence center, as proposed, will help address 
some of those voids by providing integrated, synthesized, and analyzed actionable 
intelligence to the end user.  Such a center, located within the Department of Homeland 
Security, that establishes close relationships with the Department of Health and Human 
Services and various federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies, will allow for 
much greater situational awareness of domestic medical intelligence matters.   
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Domestic medical intelligence is a field with little formal or even informal 
evidence-based research.  Due to the limited existing academic research, it is 
recommended that additional formal research be conducted on a number of aspects of 
domestic medical intelligence, including public reaction to medical intelligence 
collection, the establishment and implementation of a domestic medical intelligence 
center, the financial impacts of a domestic medical intelligence center on federal, state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments, and a more in-depth evaluation of legislative 
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barriers on state, territorial, tribal, and national levels.  As the medical intelligence field, 
and intelligence in general, continues to change and evolve, additional academic research 
and analysis will be required to ensure that the changes being made are in fact moving the 
field forward in the proper direction. 
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